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Abstract
We study the potential of general quantum operations, Trace-Preserving Completely-
Positive Maps (TPCPs), as encoding and decoding mechanisms in quantum authentication
protocols. The study shows that these general operations do not offer significant advantage
over unitary encodings. We also propose a practical authentication protocol based on the
use of two successive unitary encodings.
1 Introduction
The past two decades have seen an enormous increase in the development and use of networked
and distributed systems, providing increased functionality to the user and a more efficient use
of resources. To benefit from such systems, users cooperate by exchanging information over
communication channels. In many occasions, this information requires to be protected from
unauthorised users. The whole discipline of Cryptography [1] addresses this issue.
Security in communication channels has been greatly improved by recent advances in the
field of Quantum Information Processing (QIP). The most notable example is Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) [2, 3], for which the phase of experimental demonstration inside [4] and
outside [5, 6] research laboratories has lead to the development of commercial products nowadays.
One aspect of QKD that is sometimes underestimated is the dependence of its security on the
existence of an authenticated classical channel between the users. Basically, some technique
must be designed to allow one party (the verifier) to gain assurances that the identity of another
(the claimant) is as declared, thereby preventing impersonation. The most common technique
is by the verifier checking the correctness of a message which demonstrates that the claimant is
in possession of a secret associated by design with the genuine party. Such a technique is called
a Message Authentication Code (MAC), first proposed by Gilbert and co-workers in [7]. More
formally, an authentication code involves a set of source messages, S, a set of authentication
tags, T , a set K of secret keys, and a set of rules such that each k ∈ K defines a mapping
to obtain the tag from the source message: uk : S → T . According to this, an authenticated
message, consisting of a source state and its tag, (s, t), with t = uk(s), can be verified only by the
intended recipient, with whom a key has been shared previously. There are many MACs with
different degrees of security. MACs intended to provide unconditional security were first studied
by Wegman and Carter [8] combining one-time pads with hash functions. This approach was
later pursued by Brassard [9] trading unconditional security for short keys, and further refined
by Krawczyk [10].
The use of quantum resources to obtain more efficient classical-message authentication
schemes is still an open issue. In [11] the authors showed that quantum information techniques
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can be used to authenticate a binary classical message with a key of length shorter than the one
required by classical schemes. However, it is not clear yet whether that would be the case with
longer messages. Leung [12] has recognised the potential relevance of authenticating quantum
information in future quantum communication systems, and Barnum and coworkers [13] have
proposed a secret-key quantum authentication protocol that uses stabiliser purity testing codes.
Surprisingly, they showed that any protocol that guarantees secure authenticity must encrypt the
quantum plain-text almost perfectly. This fact contrasts with classical MACs, where encryption
of the plain-text is not necessary for unconditional security. More recently, Gea-Banacloche [14]
has approached data authentication from a steganographic perspective, making use of quantum
correcting code techniques.
In this paper we extend and further develop previous work [15, 16] on the authentication
of quantum information with unitary coding sets. Our purpose is two-fold. First, in Section 2,
we investigate whether the use of reversible TPCP maps in the encoding and decoding stages
of our protocol improves its robustness against several common attacks; we restrict ourselves
to the simple case of a single qubit since our goal is to compare our results with those of [15].
Second, in Section 3 we study the authentication of arbitrarily complex quantum messages.
Now, instead of using a TPCP map, we propose a sequence of two unitary encodings. We show
that proceeding in such a way improves the security of the authentication protocol. Finally, in
Section 4, we present our main conclusions.
2 Authentication with general quantum operations
In the general quantum authentication setting Alice sends a quantum message to Bob with
the goal of making Bob confident about the authenticity of such message. If we consider that
both participants share a quantum secret key (for example, a set of EPR pairs), and they have
access to an authenticated classical channel, then the solution is quite simple: Alice can just use
quantum teleportation [17] to send the quantum plain-text. However, here we shall assume that
no classical authenticated channel is available, and that the previously shared keys are standard
classical bits (the nature of this assumption is practical, given the technological difficulties
that still exist to the the manipulation of qubits). Our main goal is to extend the standard
MAC technique to the quantum realm. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that the source
quantum message is a qubit described by the density operator ρS belonging to a two-dimensional
source message space S. Following the standard procedure, Alice appends a tag (a public-known
quantum state) to the message in such a way that the recipient, Bob, may verify the tag and
so convince himself about the identity of the message originator. The tag is also given by a
density operator ρT , belonging to a tag space T . Therefore, the quantum tagged-message is
described by the operator ρE = ρS ⊗ ρT that acts on the state space E = S ⊗T . To validate the
message, Alice and Bob also openly agree on a particular splitting of the tag space T into valid
and invalid tags. The space T can then be seen as the direct sum of two subspaces, T = V⊕V⊥,
where V is the subspace of valid tags and V⊥ is the subspace of the invalid ones. The splitting
of T leads to the direct sum E = C ⊕ C⊥, where C = S ⊗ V (dim(C) = C) and C⊥ = S ⊗ V⊥
(dim(C⊥) = D) are, respectively, the subspaces of valid and invalid tagged messages. A message
originally prepared by Alice will thus belong to C.
We shall assume that Alice and Bob share a minimum-size key of just one bit, k. Depending
on its value, Alice performs an encoding rule on the tagged message: She will apply an I
operation in one case (Alice does nothing to the tagged message), and a reversible (to guarantee
perfect deterministic decoding) TPCP map [18, 19] in the other. It is worth noting that this
is completely equivalent, in security terms, to the use of two TPCP maps. The action of the
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TPCP map on ρE can be written as
E(ρE ) =
∑
j
djUjρEU
†
j , (1)
where the Uj are unitary operators, the dj are real and positive, and the following restrictions
apply:
∑
j
dj = 1, (2)
PiU
†
kUjPi = δjk, (3)
where Pi is the projector onto C. Condition (2) together with the unitarity of the Uj operators
guarantees that the operation will be trace-preserving. Condition (3) assures the reversibility
of the TPCP map if the input state ρE belongs to the subspace of valid messages C. After the
encoding, Alice will send to Bob, depending on the value of the key, either ρE or E(ρE ). In both
cases we will call the message sent by Alice ρE(k). On the reception side, Bob will decode the
message sent by Alice according to the value of the the key he also holds: If Alice sent ρE , Bob
will not do anything to the message. Otherwise, he will apply the decoding operation [18, 19]
R(E(ρE )) =
∑
j
PiU
†
jE(ρE )UjPi + PNE(ρE )PN , (4)
where PN = I −
∑
j UjPiU
†
j . Substituting (1) in (4) we have that R(E(ρE )) = PiρEPi = ρE , if
ρE belongs to C, recovering in this way any valid message sent by Alice. Next Bob has to verify
tag appended to the message. If it belongs to V, he will accept the message, otherwise he will
discard it suspecting a manipulation in the channel.
In the following subsections we shall analyse the security of this scheme to several attacks.
In the forgery attack we shall regard Eve capable of intercepting the state travelling from Alice
to Bob, discard it, and forge a new tagged message. In the measurement attack, Eve measures
the message in the channel trying to discover the key used. Finally, in the unitary attack, we
shall assume that Eve can modify the state in the channel by means of a unitary operation. For
simplicity we shall initially consider a two-dimensional tag space T .
2.1 Forgery attack
Suppose Eve prepares a forged tagged message ρEE and sends it to Bob trying to impersonate
Alice. When Bob receives this message, depending on the value of the key, he will either apply
to the message the decoding operation (4) or he will do nothing. After this decoding, Bob
will reject the message if the measurement on the tag space T shows that it belongs to V⊥.
Therefore, the probability Pf that Eve deceives Bob is
Pf =
1
2
trE [Piρ
E
E + PiR(ρ
E
E )]. (5)
This quantity depends both on Eve’s strategy and on the reverse of the TPCP map actually
chosen by Alice and Bob. She will succeed with probability one if
ρEE ∈ C, (6)
and
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R(ρEE ) =
∑
j
PiU
†
j ρ
E
E UjPi + PNρ
E
E PN ∈ C. (7)
To better study these conditions we will make use of the following decomposition. Defining
the orthogonal projection operators Pi and Po as the ones that, respectively, project a state
from E onto C or onto C⊥, an arbitrary operator AE can be written as
AE = Aii +Aio +Aoi +Aoo, (8)
where Ajk = PjAEPk, with j, k = i, o. If the decomposition (8) is used in operator expressions
of the form χE = AEρEA
†
E , the corresponding ‘i-o’ operators are related by the matrix equation(
χii χio
χoi χoo
)
=
(
Aii Aio
Aoi Aoo
)(
ρii ρio
ρoi ρoo
)(
A†ii A
†
oi
A†io A
†
oo
)
, (9)
where A†jk = PkA
†
EPj .
Using this decomposition, condition (6) requires the following matrix form for ρEE :
ρEE =
(
ρES 0
0 0
)
. (10)
In condition (7), the summation in the right side is always in C due to the action of Pi. We are
left with the second term. Writing Uj = U
j
ii + U
j
io + U
j
oi + U
j
oo, where U
j
kl = PkUjPl, we have:
PN = I−
∑
j
UjPiU
†
j =
(
I 0
0 I
)
−
∑
j
(
U jiiU
j†
ii U
j
iiU
j†
oi
U joiU
j†
ii U
j
oiU
j†
oi
)
≡
(
I 0
0 I
)
−
(
Gii H
H† Goi
)
. (11)
With this notation the second term of (7) vanishes when
H†ρESH = 0, (12)
and
(Gii − I)ρ
E
SH = 0, (13)
where H =
∑
j U
j
iiU
j†
oi , and Gii =
∑
j U
j
iiU
j†
ii . In order to further analyse these equations let us
first study the structure of the Uj operators. Since the tag space is two-dimensional, each Uj
will be a 4×4 square matrix. Given their unitarity, their rows and columns will be orthonormal
vectors. We may write two of these operators in column-vector form as
U1 = (u1|u2|u3|u4), (14)
U2 = (v1|v2|v3|v4), (15)
where the sets {uj} and {vj} are two basis of a four-dimensional vectorial space. The reversibility
condition, Eq. (3), imposes that the first two vectors of each set must also be orthogonal, so
the set {u1, u2, v1, v2} will also be a base. This means that we can only have two operators
composing the TPCP map. A third one will necessarily have its first two columns orthogonal to
the first two columns of the other two operators, which is impossible. Therefore, our encoding
operation can only be composed of up to dim(E)/dim(C) (2 in our case) unitary operators.
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With two unitary operators forming the encoding operation and a two-dimensional tag space,
we can calculate H =
∑
j U
j
iiU
j†
oi . Using the fact that {u1, u2, v1, v2} is an orthonormal base,
we obtain H = 0, and analogously Gii =
∑
j U
j
iiU
j†
ii = I. So Eve will always fulfil conditions
(12) and (13). This will always happen if we choose the maximum number of unitary operators
allowed by the dimensions of E and C. One possibility to overcome this would be to choose only
one unitary operator, but then the encoding operation would be unitary, and it has been shown
in [15] that with a one-bit key a unitary encoding is not secure. Another possibility would be to
use a larger tag space T that will increment dim(E) without increasing dim(C) (V will remain as
a one-dimensional subspace of T ). This will allow us to use more unitary operators to form the
non-unitary TPCP map without choosing the maximum of operators allowed by the dimensions
of E and C. Specifically, if we use two qubits for the tag, we have a four-dimensional tag space T .
Imposing that the valid tag subspace V is one-dimensional, we have that dim(E) = 8, dim(C) = 2,
and dim(E)/dim(C) = 4. We can thus choose up to three unitary operators to construct the
TPCP map. With two or three operators it is easy for Alice and Bob to make impossible for
Eve to satisfy (12) and (13). This follows from the fact that to fulfil (12) Eve has to choose ρES
with support on the kernel of H†. But since since dim(C) < dim(C⊥) and H† acts from C on
C⊥, Alice and Bob can always choose Uj such that the kernel of H
† is empty. Therefore, there is
no ρES fulfilling (12). Therefore, in the following we will shall consider a tag space of dimension
greater than two.
2.2 Measurement attack
Now Eve tries to measure the message sent by Alice to discover the key used and replace the
message with one of her own. Since Eve does not know which message, ρS , was sent, the
only way she has to discern between the two possible values of the key is measuring the tag.
Therefore, to make this strategy successful, Eve needs the tag of any message encoded with E(·)
to belong to V⊥ so as to distinguish it from the tag of a message encoded with I that belongs
to V. Specifically, Eve needs that
∑
j
dj
(
U jii U
j
io
U joi U
j
oo
)(
ρS 0
0 0
)(
U j†ii U
j†
oi
U j†io U
j†
oo
)
=
(
0 0
0 ρ′S
)
. (16)
This condition requires that
∑
j
djU
j
iiρSU
j†
ii = 0, ∀ρS , (17)
and
∑
j
djU
j
oiρSU
j†
ii = 0, ∀ρS . (18)
Since the dj are positive, each term in (17) is positive and Eve needs that
U jiiρSU
j†
ii = 0, ∀ρS ,∀j. (19)
This is true ∀ρS iff U
j
ii = 0, ∀j, which is easily avoided by design.
2.3 Unitary attack
Let us assume now that Eve performs a unitary quantum operation FE on the encoded tagged
message in transit between Alice and Bob. This operation changes the state of the encoded
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message from ρE(k) to FEρE(k)F
†
E . Bob, ignorant about this action, will perform his decoding
operation on the encoded tagged message received. Since Eve does not know the value of the
key used, the probability of deceiving Bob will be
Pu =
1
2
trE [PiFEρEF
†
E + PiR(FEE(ρE )F
†
E )], (20)
with
R(FEE(ρE )F
†
E ) =
∑
k
PiU
†
kFE
∑
j
djUjρEU
†
jF
†
EUkPi + PNFE
∑
j
djUjρEU
†
jF
†
EPN . (21)
In other words, for Eve to succeed with Pu = 1, she needs that
FEρEF
†
E ∈ C, (22)
and
R(FEE(ρE )F
†
E ) ∈ C. (23)
The first condition means that
(
Fii Fio
Foi Foo
)(
ρS 0
0 0
)(
F †ii F
†
oi
F †io F
†
oo
)
=
(
ρ′S 0
0 0
)
. (24)
This condition is satisfied if
FE =
(
Fii 0
0 Foo
)
. (25)
Writing (23) as in (21), we see that the first term of (21) always fulfils (23). Suppose Eve can
choose the operator FE such that it commutes with PN , then the second term in (21) transforms
to
FEPN
∑
j
djUjPiρEPiU
†
jPNF
†
E , (26)
where we have also used the fact that ρE belongs to C, and so ρE = PiρEPi. Now using the
reversibility condition (3) it is easy to see that the operator PNUjPi is identically zero for all j:
PNUjPi = (I −
∑
k
UkPiU
†
k)UjPi = UjPi −
∑
k 6=j
UkPiU
†
kUjPi − UjPiU
†
jUjPi = 0, (27)
where the second term is zero because of (3), and the other two terms cancel out each other. Thus
we have shown that, provided Eve can find a unitary operator FE fulfilling (25) and commuting
with the projector PN , she can deceive Bob with probability equal to one. Does such unitary
operator exist?
Let us explore the similarity of this problem to the one we faced in [16] (unitary encodings).
Let PM be the the projector orthogonal to PN :
PM = I − PN =
∑
j
UjPiU
†
j =
(
Gii H
H† Goi
)
. (28)
(29)
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Since FE is unitary, condition (25) is equivalent to [FE , Pi] = 0, and so our problem (Eve finding
FE making Pu = 1) can be stated in compact form as:
[FE , Pi] = 0, (30)
[FE , PM ] = 0. (31)
Note that these equations do not explicitly depend on the index j, that is, on the individual
form of the encoding operators Uj , but on a global characteristic of the TPCP map (through
the sum inside PM ). For this individual dependence to dissappear, and also for PM to be a
projector, it is essential the relation between the Uj defined by the reversibility condition.
From [16] we know that the problem given by Eqs. (30)–(31) has solution regardless its
dimension and the explicit form or rank of the two projectors. In fact, the problem is completely
equivalent to the one studied there for the case of a unitary encoding with just one bit of key.
In particular, the family of FE fulfilling (30)-(31) is the same, and so Eve can transform the
original message as desired. Thus we conclude that, using the more general set of reversible
TPCP maps for encoding, one bit of key is still not enough to authenticate one qubit quantum
message.
3 Double encoding
In the preceding section we have shown that using more general encodings, such as TPCP
maps, does not provide any advantage over unitary operations in the authentication of an
elemental piece of quantum information (a qubit). Therefore, it seems reasonable to undertake
the authentication of arbitrary quantum information with unitary encodings. In [16] we did so
for the case in which Alice and Bob share a classical n-bit key. According to this authentication
procedure, Alice, depending on the value of the key, performs a unitary encoding rule on the
tagged message, U(k), selected from the unitary coding set {U(0), · · · , U(K−1)}, where K = 2n
and U(0) = I. We found the necessary conditions that this unitary coding set must satisfy to
protect against forgery and unitary attacks. Unfortunately, these conditions cannot be fulfilled
simultaneously, i.e. the encoding operators that minimise Eve’s probability of success in a forgery
attack does not protect at all against the unitary attack. In this section we present a two-stage
encoding procedure that tries to circumvent such deficiency. The different phases of this new
protocol are the following:
1. Tag 1 : Alice prepares her message, ρS , which belongs to the state space S (dim(S) = S).
She now appends to the message a tag described by ρT1 that belongs to the state space
T1 (dim(T1) = T1). The space of tagged messages is E1 = S ⊗ T1, and the tagged message
will be described by ρE1 = ρS ⊗ ρT1 . Alice and Bob openly agree on a particular splitting
of the tag space T1 into the direct sum of two subspaces T1 = V1 ⊕ V
⊥
1 , where V1 is the
subspace of valid tags, and V⊥1 is the subspace of the invalid ones. This splitting of T1
leads to the direct sum E1 = C1⊕C
⊥
1
, where C1 = S ⊗V1 is the subspace of valid messages
(dim(C1) = C1), and C
⊥
1 = S ⊗ V
⊥
1 is the subspace of the invalid ones (dim(C
⊥
1 ) = D1).
2. Encoding 1 : Alice, depending on the value of a n1-bit key shared with Bob, performs
an encoding rule on the tagged message. The encoding rule, U1(p), is selected from the
unitary encoding set {U1(0), · · · , U1(K1 − 1)}, where K1 = 2
n1 and U1(0) = I. If the
tagged message is ρE1 , the state of the message after this encoding is
ρE1(p) = U1(p)ρE1U
†
1
(p). (32)
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Thus, a tagged message encoded by Alice with U1(p) will necessarily belong to Cp, the
subspace of all the tagged messages transformed by U1(p). The aim of this first encoding
is to protect against unitary attacks. As it has been shown in [16], the Ck subspaces, k =
0, ...,K1 − 1, must be chosen at an intermediate point between zero and total overlapping
so as to offer the best possible protection against this type of attack.
3. Tag 2 : After this first encoding, Alice appends a second tag ρT2 to the already encoded
and tagged message, obtaining
ρE = ρE1(p)⊗ ρT2 . (33)
The state space of the second tag is T2 and is analogously divided into the subspaces
of valid and invalid tags T2 = V2 ⊕ V
⊥
2
. The space of the messages tagged twice is
E = E1 ⊗ T2 = S ⊗ T1 ⊗ T2, and the valid and invalid message subspaces E = C ⊕ C
⊥
(dim(C) = C, dim(C⊥) = D). The second tag appended by Alice will thus belong to V2.
Regardless of the dimension of T2, we shall assume V2 to be one-dimensional, with |0〉T2 a
base of this subspace, and thus ρT2 = |0〉〈0|T2 .
4. Encoding 2 : Finally, Alice performs a second encoding on the twice-tagged message de-
pending on the value of a second key q shared with Bob. The encoding rule, U2(q), is
selected from the unitary coding set {U2(0), · · · , U2(K2−1)}, with U2(0) = I. This second
encoding is intended to protect the message against forgery attacks without interfering
with the first encoding. In order to achieve this goal, Alice and Bob choose a number of
operators K2 − 1 equal to the dimension of the invalid tag subspace V
⊥
2 . Let us consider
the following base of this subspace: {|1〉T2 , |2〉T2 , . . . , |K2 − 1〉T2}. The encoding operators
{U2(0), · · · , U2(K2 − 1)} acting on E can be written as U2(k) =
∑K2−1
j,l=0 U2(k)jl ⊗ |j〉〈l|T2
with U2(k)jl acting on E1 = S ⊗ T1. We shall further impose on the unitary encoding
operators the condition U2(k)0j = U2(k)j0 = δjk. As we shall explain later, this allows to
protect the message against forgery without interfering with the first encoding. After this
second encoding, the expression for the message to be sent through the channel is:
ρE(q) = U2(q)ρE1(p)⊗ |0〉〈0|T2U
†
2
(q). (34)
5. Verification: When Bob receives the message, he performs the matching decoding rule to
Alice’s second encoding, U †
2
(q), and measures the second tag attached. If it belongs to V2,
he will continue, after tracing out the second tag attached, with the verification procedure:
He will first decode, with U †
1
(p), Alice’s first encoding, and then will measure the first tag
and check whether it belongs to V1. If this is the case, Bob will regard the message as
authentic and will recover the original plain-text after tracing out both tags.
We shall now analyse the effects of Eve’s attacks on this protocol.
3.1 Forgery attack
In this attack Eve has the power to replace the tagged message in transit between Alice and
Bob with a forged tagged message of her own, ρE . From this message, Bob will perform his first
decoding obtaining
U †
2
(q)ρEU2(q), (35)
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with q the value of the second key shared with Alice. The probability of Eve being undetected
is
Pf =
1
K2
K2−1∑
k=0
trE
[
P2U2(k)
†ρEU2(k)
]
=
1
K2
K2−1∑
k=0
trE [P2(k)ρE ] , (36)
where P2 = IE1 ⊗ |0〉〈0|T2 is the projector onto C, and P2(k) = U2(k)P2U
†
2
(k) is the projector
onto C transformed by U2(k). But, since we have imposed before that U2(k)0j = U2(k)j0 = δjk,
P2(k) = IE1⊗|k〉〈k|T2 , and then Pf = 1/K2. Therefore, Alice and Bob can decrease Eve’s success
probability increasing K2, protecting in this way the message against forgery. Note also that the
projectors P2(k) are mutually orthogonal. In other words, the effect of the condition imposed
over the set of operators U2(k) is to transform the space of valid messages C into orthogonal,
disjoint subspaces. In [16] we showed that this type of unitary set provides optimal protection
against forgery attacks.
3.2 Unitary attack
Let us now assume that Eve performs a unitary quantum operation FE on the encoded tagged
message in transit between Alice and Bob. This operation changes the state of the message from
ρE(q) to FEρE(q)F
†
E . Bob, ignorant about this action, will perform his first decoding operation
on the message received, obtaining as the decoded tagged message
U †
2
(q)FEρE(q)F
†
EU2(q). (37)
Thus, the probability of Eve being unnoticed after this first test is
Pu =
1
K2
K2−1∑
k=0
trE
[
P2U
†
2
(k)FEρE(k)F
†
EU2(k)
]
=
1
K2
K2−1∑
k=0
trE
[
F †EP2(k)FEρE(k)
]
. (38)
Since the subspaces obtained after transforming C with the set U2(k) are all orthogonal, disjoint
subspaces of E , if Eve chooses a unitary operator FE acting inside each subspace separately
according to
FE =
K2−1∑
j=0
Fjj ⊗ |j〉〈j|T2 , (39)
with Fjj unitary and acting on E1, then F
†
EP2(k)FE = P2(k), and she will always pass Bob’s first
test. The manipulated message that Bob accepts after his first test will be
ρ′E1(p) = trT2
(
P2(q)FEU2(q)ρE1(p)⊗ |0〉〈0|T2U
†
2
(q)F †E
)
. (40)
After some algebra it can be shown that ρ′E1(p) reduces to FqqρE1(p)F
†
qq, where ρE1(p) is the
original message tagged for the first time by Alice, and encoded with U1(p). Bob will now
decode this message with U †
1
(p), and verify the first tag appended by Alice. Therefore, if Alice
and Bob choose the unitary encoding set {U1(0), · · · , U1(K1 − 1)} to offer the best possible
protection against a unitary attack regardless of its effectiveness against a forgery attack, the
entire procedure will protect the message simultaneously against both attacks with the best
protection that a single encoding can give against each attack separately.
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4 Conclusion
In Section 2 our goal has been to investigate whether the use of TPCP maps in the encoding
and decoding operations could improve the security of authentication protocols as compared to
the unitary encoding studied in [15] and [16]. In [15] we showed that one bit of key is enough to
protect one qubit of message against forgery or measurement attacks, but not against unitary
attacks. One could expect that the extended complexity of a TPCP encoding would protect
more efficiently against these attacks. However, we have found exactly the opposite to hold: the
use of a TPCP map does not improve at all the security of the protocol with one bit of key;
in fact, there is no reason for Alice and Bob to use it, as it needs more resources. This result
is strongly related to the reversibility condition imposed on the TPCP map. That condition
requires the TPCP map to act inside the coding subspace, effectively, as a collective unitary
operator.
With this idea in mind, in Section 3 we have approached the authentication of arbitrary
quantum information with a double encoding. We have shown that it offers simultaneous pro-
tection against unitary and forgery attacks with the best protection that a single encoding can
give to each attack separately.
Many open questions related to the quantum authentication schemes analysed deserve further
investigation. For example, a more practical definition of the probability of failure is required.
For instance, Eve might, with high probability, transform the original message, but only in a
way such that the fidelity between the original and the transformed state be still very high. It
could also be the case that she could strongly transform, without being noticed, messages inside
a particular subspace of the valid message space, and be noticed if she transforms messages
outside of it. All these situations would have to be considered by Alice and Bob in any practical
implementation of the protocol.
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